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Introduction
In 2000, there were as many countries served by a single mobile network as by network competition. Today, only 30 countries 1 , representing less than 3% of the world's population, are served by a single network. This strong shift towards network competition is shown in the following graph. The exact details of the SWN proposals vary across countries. However, a common theme is that the SWN would typically have a competitive edge on the existing networks, for instance by having access to all 700 megahertz (MHz) spectrum, and that the government would have some ownership of the SWN. As a result, the SWN would be expected to remove competition at the wholesale-level, but there would continue to be retail competition. Other operators, including existing network operators, would have to largely rely on wholesale agreements with the SWN to offer next generation mobile services to its retail customers.
SWNs have been proposed for a variety of reasons, with the exact rationale depending on the specific country in question. However, the reasons can be split into three broad categories. First, there have been concerns that competing operators will not deliver enough or fast enough network coverage, particularly in rural areas. Second, some If an SWN were to fail, then this could cause serious consumer detriment, given the lack of alternative network operators that consumers could switch to.
As shown by the figure above, there have been several countries that have relied on only one vertically-integrated mobile operator, either government owned or privately owned. Therefore, in this paper the authors compare the outcomes under network competition relative to single networks, as a proxy for SWNs. While they recognise this is not a perfect equivalent to an SWN, because the SWN will introduce retail competition via network access to the SWN, it can be used as a 'second-best' approximation to assess the expected long-term effects of moving away from network competition to an SWN model.
Ideally, the authors would want to compare consumer outcomes in (a) countries with network competition (i.e. competition between multiple vertically integrated network operators) with (b) outcomes in countries with a single wholesale network, with competing retail providers and (c) outcomes in countries with a single (vertically integrated) network provider. The lack of data on (b) implies that it is not possible to do this comparison because they do not have data on (b). It is still useful to compare (a) with (c), for which they have significant data, primarily because  a significant proportion of costs for mobile operators are incurred at the network-level rather than at the retail-level and the wholesale network services account for more than 50% of the value added of mobile services; and  most of the innovation and technology adoption that has driven the very significant improvements in efficiency happens at the 'wholesale network' level.
Therefore, their analysis still provides a useful insight into the expected performance of SWNs compared to network competition model.
The authors assess the impact of network competition on network coverage, take-up and innovation. They find that network competition delivers superior outcomes to single networks. This paper represents a significant contribution to the literature. To the authors' knowledge, no other papers have considered the impact of network competition compared to single networks on outcomes such as coverage 5 . This may be partly because it is difficult to get data on coverage, particularly at the countrylevel rather than at the operator-level. Although there has been much discussion around the optimal number of mobile network operators, there has been much less consideration of whether network competition should be preferred to single networks.
The policy implications of the results are also significant, as they imply that regulators and governments could be taking a considerable risk by implementing SWNs in the mobile sector, which could lead to worse outcome for end users in terms of availability and quality of mobile services. Moreover, once an SWN has been established, it will be difficult and time consuming to then return back to network competition.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows:  In an appendix, they provide further details on the data used.
Theory: the impact of network competition
Proponents of SWNs argue that network competition results in lower network coverage, particularly in rural areas. This is because there are likely to be some areas where it is only profitable for one operator to roll-out its network. If multiple operators roll-out their networks to these areas, then the operators may not have sufficient retail customers to be able to cover their costs.
In reality, there are reasons why you wouldn't expect coverage to be lower under network competition.
First, under network competition, operators will be trying to get ahead of their rivals.
When it is not profitable for multiple operators to rollout in a particular area, it may nonetheless be possible for one network to gain a 'first mover' advantage and capture the entire retail demand in the area. Once they have done so, they can be confident that it would be unprofitable for any other operator to follow, at least until the given area becomes commercially viable for more than one operator. 6 Second, there are many examples of network sharing across countries. Network sharing can mean that rather than duplicate costs such as towers, infrastructure and equipment, competing networks can share these costs. This makes extensive network roll-out more viable.
Third, coverage obligations imposed at the time of licence award have been used to ensure faster roll out and greater coverage in many countries. The Government provides indirect funding, to the extent that network operators will pay the Government less for a licence which includes obligations to cover areas which are otherwise uneconomic for them to do so.
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This is consistent with the observation that mobile operators in a given country often have different levels of coverage supports, indicating that some areas may only be covered by one operator. At the same time, the authors recognise that coverage is a dynamic concept and with the decreasing cost of equipment and the increasing demand for mobile services one would expect that more areas become economically viable for multiple networks.
Fourth, network competition puts pressure on operators to minimise costs. Even though it may be difficult for operators to reduce the unit prices of network equipment, they are able to ensure that they optimise their network and minimise their operating expenditure. Lowering costs should help make it economically viable to roll-out to more areas, which will increase coverage.
Fifth, if unregulated, a network monopoly will have less incentive to extend coverage than network competitors in the same way as a monopoly produces less output than a competitive market.
Advocates of SWNs rarely consider the impact that single networks could have on innovation. Even though mobile technologies are typically developed at an international level, the speed at which they become available to consumers depends crucially on national policies and market structures. Innovation, broadly defined, drives the speed of adoption of new technologies and technology upgrades in mobile
networks. This has a major effect on reducing the unit costs of services for consumers and extending profitable network coverage. One reason why technology upgrades are so important is that each new technology generation delivers significant gains in spectral efficiency. Given that spectrum is scarce, this leads to much needed increases in capacity in mobile networks, Innovation also determines the range of services which consumers can enjoy over the networks that have been built.
In addition, SWNs will require heavy regulation in the form of access prices to the SWN, coverage obligations, introduction of new services and deployment of new technologies. Given information asymmetries and regulatory failures, regulation is likely to lead to sub-optimal outcomes.
Literature review -existing empirical evidence
The authors have reviewed the existing literature on the impact of completion on takeup of telecommunication services and investment in the sector. The available evidence indicates that there is a positive link between competition, service diffusion and investment. None of these studies, however, directly looks at the performance countries with a single mobile network compared with network competition countries.
Moreover, the global data set used provides a unique insight into the performance of single mobile networks.
The relationship between competition and performance of telecommunications markets has received a significant attention in the academic literature over the last two decades, in particular following the liberalisation of mobile market in a number of countries.
The primary focus of these studies seems to be the link between competition and the diffusion of telecommunications services. Early contributions include Gruber and In the existing literature, there has also been much debate about the impact of market concentration on innovation. On one side of the debate is the Schumpeter view, which considers that high market concentration increases innovation, as it is easier to reap the return on investments with higher concentration and there are economies of scale in research and development (R&D). On the other side of the debate is the Arrow view, which states that lower market concentration increases the incentive to innovate as firms will want to get ahead of their rivals and thereby steal their customers. This is also known as the replacement effect. With lower market concentration, there will also be more firms who are searching for innovations and this also increases the probability of an innovation being discovered 7 .
The overall impact of market concentration on innovation therefore depends on whether the Schumpeter or replacement effect dominates. In an attempt to consider both effects and reconcile exiting mixed evidence, the seminal paper by Aghion et. al. 
Approach and data used
The key question is how an SWN would perform relative to a counterfactual of network competition. As there are no examples of SWNs in the mobile industry, it is not possible to answer this question directly. However, there are countries that only have a single vertically integrated network. Therefore, to help gain an insight into the potential impact of an SWN, the authorshave compared the outcomes between 10 Studies differ in a number of dimensions, including: data set, control variables, statistical approach, etc.
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Lines based on local loop unbundling. 12 See the literature review included in Lestage et al. (2013) .
countries that have network competition and countries that have single networks. In particular, they have assessed the impact of network competition on overall population and geographic coverage, overall take-up and innovation (3G take-up). 13 The data on network coverage comes from the GSMA. The level of coverage is estimated based on the location of base stations in each country, the reach of these base stations and the distribution of inhabitants across the country. This provides estimates of network coverage for the country as a whole, rather than for individual operators. In general, it is difficult to get data on network coverage across a broad range of countries, which is one of the reasons why this paper adds to the existing literature, as the authors are not aware of any other papers that have analysed the impact of mobile competition on coverage.
The authors have also estimated the impact of single networks on overall take-up.
SWN proponents claim that SWNs could also reduce costs by avoiding inefficient duplication. As it is difficult to assess the direct impact of single networks on costs, due to a lack of data availability on network costs, Costs are likely to feed through into prices and thereby influence take-up which is why they have assessed the impact of single networks on overall mobile take-up 14 . 15 .
Finally, the authors have assessed the impact of single networks on innovation by considering the impact on 3G take-up. As 3G represented an upgrade to mobile networks which made mobile internet much more widespread, 3G is a good proxy for the impact that SWN could have on innovation. This is an important point, since innovation plays such a large role in the mobile sector.
For the analysis on coverage and overall take-up, the authors have used data from 2001. This is because there were significantly more single network countries when using historical data. The year 2001 is the first year in which there is coverage data for a wide range of countries. The other benefit of using data from 2001 is that there was considerable variation in the level of coverage across countries (in contrast, many 13 Due to the lack of reliable data on innovation, the authors consider that the take-up of more advanced mobile technologies (that allow provision of mobile broadband services) can be used as a reasonable proxy for the level of innovation in a given market.
14 Mobile take-up is measured based on the number of unique mobile subscribers. This is different to the number of SIM cards since some subscribers have more than one SIM card. For the analysis on 3G take-up, the authors have used data from 2012q4, given that 3G is still a relatively new technology in some countries.
As shown by the following graphs, it appears that outcomes on coverage, overall takeup and 3G take-up are more favourable under network competition. The graphs show that this conclusion still holds when splitting the sample based on the population of countries 16 . Figure 2 shows that overall population coverage was considerably higher in countries with network competition (70.4% compared to 53.4% when including all countries regardless of their size) 17 .The authors have carried out the same analysis for area coverage (see Figure 3) . Again they find that coverage is much higher in countries with network competition (47.9% compared to 31.4% when including all countries regardless of their size). 18 The authors have also considered how the take-up 16 Low population countries are defined as countries with fewer than a 1 million inhabitants. 17 This difference is statistically significant with a p-value of 0.0029. 18 The difference for all countries is statistically significant with a p-value of 0.0229.
of 3G
19 compares across countries. (Figure 4) . The results also show that 3G take-up is much higher in countries with network competition. The authors have not shown a graph with the countries split by GDP per capita due to a lack of data availability.
As a sensitivity analysis, we have therefore reclassified these two countries as single networks, which has only a very minimal impact on the results.
The authors have included different explanatory variables in their regressions to help isolate the impact of single networks. They have included a range of demographic variables, including GDP per capita, population size and population density. As a sensitivity check, they have also included a variable measuring the number of years since 2G was launched in the country. The time at which 2G is launched could impact coverage and take-up as it is a variable that is largely outside of the control of operators because it depends on when regulators or the Government decided to provide the necessary licences and spectrum. There are clearly other variables that could affect the outcome in mobile markets, such as prices, subsidies, coverage obligations and the degree of network sharing. However, it is difficult to collect data for these metrics for such a broad set of countries as the authors have in their sample.
Ultimately, the question is whether any of the omitted variables might also be correlated with whether there is network competition. The answer is probably yes, at least for prices. However, this bias would actually lead us to understate the impact of network competition on coverage. As prices will be higher in single network countries, the estimated parameter in the regression will be higher for countries with single networks. Therefore if anything, the authors would be overestimating the impact of single networks on coverage and take-up
The following equations show the different specifications:
(1) Overall population coverage =  + *single network + *GDP per capita + population + *population density (2) Overall area coverage =  + *single network + *GDP per capita + population + *population density + time since 2G (3) Overall mobile take-up =  + *single network + *GDP per capita + population + *population density (4) Overall mobile take-up =  + *single network + *GDP per capita + population + *population density + time since 2G (5) 3G take-up =  + *single network + *GDP per capita + population + *population density
The following table shows the summary statistics for the variables of interest. All of the data comes from the GSMA database. The authors have estimated their regressions using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with robust standard errors to correct for heteroskedasticity. In the academic literature, there is a debate as to whether there is a two-way relationship between market structure and market outcomes. For example, it is sometimes argued that market outcomes could impact the number of players in the market as well as vice versa. If there is such a two-way relationship, then it may not be appropriate to use OLS. However, they do not consider this to be the case in this particular situation.
When and whether a mobile market moves from one to several operators is largely determined by when regulators or the Government decide to liberalise the market.
This decision will in most cases be independent of market outcomes. In addition to the above specifications, the authors have also conducted a number of sensitivity tests (not shown). In particular, they have used a later time period (2005) for the overall coverage and take-up regressions, have used a measure of political risk based on data from the World Bank and have included urbanisation. None of these sensitivity tests change their overall conclusion that network competition delivers favourable outcomes.
Conclusions and policy implications
This paper has added to the existing literature by assessing the impact of mobile network competition on a range of outcomes, including network coverage. The key conclusion is that mobile network competition has delivered superior outcomes to single networks. Clearly, the paper does not provide a complete assessment of all of the determinants of consumer outcomes, as it is challenging to accurately capture all differences in regulatory frameworks and market conditions across countries.
However, it does highlight the importance of network competition, and provides a platform for future research into how best to leverage network competition to achieve positive consumer outcomes.
The empirical evidence on the evolution of mobile markets suggests that network competition leads to higher coverage. The authors found that population coverage was up to 21% higher in countries with network competition compared to countries served by a single network, all else equal.
There are several plausible explanations for why coverage isn't higher in single network countries. Due to operators trying to gain a first mover advantage, under network competition, it is still possible that certain areas may only have one operator if it isn't profitable to have more than one operator. There is also widespread evidence of network sharing and coverage obligations, which both lead to higher coverage.
Also, when faced with competition, operators will be under pressure to minimise their costs, which will help make more areas economically viable and extend network coverage. Lastly, it seems that regulatory obligations to extend coverage in these countries, if existed, has not been as effective as network competition. This is not surprising given that regulation is less effective than competition to enhance welfare.
Their results also show that overall take-up is higher in countries with single The experience from fixed segment (e.g. NBN in Australia) indicates that setting up an SWN will be challenging, as governments and regulators will need to address a range of issues, such as whether the assets and customers of the existing operators are transferred to the SWN, the governance arrangements of the SWN, and attracting investors for the SWN. Once an SWN has been established, it will need to be regulated on an ongoing basis, given that it will have monopoly power. Setting prices and expected quality levels for a monopolist is never easy, and will be particularly challenging in this scenario, as there will be a lack of historical data. If the SWN does end up failing, then it will not be straight-forward to return to network competition, during which time consumers could suffer considerably.
At the same time, there are several policy options that regulators and governments can rely on if they are concerned about the level of mobile coverage. For example, they can encourage network sharing agreements, they can provide rural subsidies and/or they can set coverage obligations when selling spectrum rights. These alternatives are far less risky than an implementing an SWN and still allows the mobile sector to benefit from network competition. Therefore, the authors believe that Governments considering some form of intervention in mobile markets should carefully assess pros and cons of different policy measures, taking into account the risks attached to untested solutions such as SWN and the potential long-term consequences on the mobile markets in a given country. 
Appendix -Summary of the data
